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How I Learned to Start Worrying and Love the Just War Tradition1 
 
 
“The art of losing isn’t hard to master; 
so many things seem filled with the intent 
to be lost that their loss is no disaster.” 
Elizabeth Bishop (1983) 
 
Introduction 
The purpose of this essay is not to review Maja Zehfuss’s War and the Politics of Ethics (2018). 
A thought-provoking work that demonstrates range and bite, Zehfuss’s book speaks for itself. 
Rather, the aim of this essay is to pull out for further analysis one particularly interesting 
concept that Zehfuss develops over the course of this text. I am speaking about the concept of 
“ethical war” that lies at the heart of Zehfuss’s general argument. Instead, however, of simply 
explicating this concept, I wish to peel back its corners and examine the nature of its relation 
to the deeper, older ideas that it rests upon. What ideas are these? I am speaking, of course, 
about the beliefs and commitments that have coalesced over time to form what we know today 
as the just war tradition.2 My intention in pursuing this agenda is to flip Zehfuss’s argument on 
its head. Where she presents the concept of ethical war as a stick with which to beat the just 
war tradition, that is, as a prism through which to critique it, I argue that the just war tradition 
furnishes us with both a critical perspective on and corrective to the concept of ethical war. 
This leads to a broader argument about how we ought to approach the idea of just war today. I 
will contend that just war thinking, properly understood, is about loss and learning how to cope 
with it. Just war, on this view, is never a victory, nor a solution, it is always a defeat, always a 
disaster, always a tragedy; and just war thinking is about coming to terms with this. 
                                                     
1 The author would like to thank Nisha Shah, Dirk Nabers, and Maja Zehfuss for the generous invitation to take 
part in this symposium. I am also grateful to my fellow participants and to the anonymous reviewers for this 
journal for their helpful advice on the drafting of this article.  
2 I prefer the term “just war tradition” to “just war theory” for reasons I set out elsewhere (O’Driscoll 2013). 
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I will pursue this agenda via three steps, with each granted its own section. The first 
section introduces the concept of “ethical war” and demonstrates how the critique of the just 
war tradition that Zehfuss develops on the back of it misses the target. The second section argue 
that even though Zehfuss’s critique is wide of the mark, it reveals an irony that just war thinkers 
must confront. The final section makes a case for how that same irony should be confronted. 
The essay will then conclude with a few brief remarks that, inverting Doctor Strangelove, are 
intended to remind us why we should learn to start worrying by loving the just war tradition.   
 
Ethical War 
I will begin with a brief synopsis of Zehfuss’s general argument before saying a few words 
about why her critique of the just war tradition is miscued. Zehfuss’s starting point is the 
concept of “ethical war”.3 She uses this term to denote the idea favoured by Western states that 
war can be “pursued in the name of the good (10).” It stands for the contention that the use of 
force, if harnessed to ethical purposes, such as spreading democracy and human rights and 
defending the defenceless, can make the world a better place to live (179). Although they may 
at first appear naïve, these aspirations have had a significant impact on how Western states 
have viewed and approached matters of war and peace over the past quarter-century at least. 
As Zehfuss observes, “Since the end of the Cold War, the West has branded its own wars as 
ethical wars, casting its troops as ‘forces for good’ with the ability to make the world a better 
place not just for Westerners, but crucially also for people in the regions where its wars are 
conducted (Ibid).” These aspirations are further reinforced in official mission statements that 
celebrate the militaries of the United States (US) and United Kingdom (UK) and their allies as 
a “force for good in the world (8).” In this imaginary, she adds, “going to war is a way of doing 
good (179).” 
                                                     
3 I will drop the use of scare-quotes for all further references to “ethical war”. 
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 The problem for Zehfuss is that the idea of ethical war is paradoxical in ways that are 
so obvious they barely need describing. It bombs the very populations it purports to defend; it 
kills in order to protect; it destroys villages to save them (17). Moreover, in so doing it 
establishes that the lives of those civilians for whom these wars are ostensibly being fought are 
more expendable than those of the soldiers supposedly sent to protect them (18-21). One could 
query some of the finer points of this argument, but it is more important to note the basic truth 
of Zehfuss’s claims and the forcefulness of how she presents them.4 
 It is at this juncture that the just war tradition enters the picture. Taking Barack Obama’s 
Nobel Peace Prize speech as her foil, Zehfuss introduces this tradition as the predominant 
framework for thinking about war and ethics today, and the primary means of negotiating the 
paradox of ethical war (11; 22). In her own words (22), “We are apparently compelled to think 
about what should be done with and in war through just war thinking.” Herein lies the rub. Just 
war thinking does not just help us negotiate—as in, think through or respond to—the dilemmas 
provoked by “ethical war”, it is also constitutive of them. That is to say, it is generative of the 
idea and practice of “ethical war”. As Zehfuss explains, “Ethical war is debated, legitimized, 
and enacted within a space which, in the absence of other credible approaches, is shaped … by 
just war thinking (28).” The just war framing is problematic, she continues (181), because it 
offers the “dangerous illusion” that war can be tamed by ethical strictures when the reality is 
quite the opposite.5 By fostering the impression that war can be a calibrated “instrument of 
ethics”, just war thinking “enables” it and “enhances its violence” (8; 3; 182).   
 If Zehfuss’s argument offers nothing especially new to this point, where she takes it 
next changes that. Contra Michael Walzer (2002), she contends that the cause of the problem 
she has just described is not shoddy just war thinking per se. Rather, it is the “structural position 
                                                     
4 For a more detailed discussion of the empirical claims: Sebastian Kaempf (2018). 
5 Zehfuss (185-86; 3)makes use of a series of binary oppositions to emphasise this point: enhances/reduces, 
ameliorates/aggravates, and constraining/enabling.  
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[of just war thinking] within our wider imaginary (195).” Specifically, the problem stems from 
the fact that just war thinking is both predicated upon and perpetuates the false promise of a 
purely ethical approach to war. As a result, war is posited as an ethical rather than a political 
problem (Ibid).6 The result is an aporetic discourse that offers only dead-ends, disconnects, and 
a deepening of the problems it ostensibly addresses (207; 39). Zehfuss’s response is not a call 
to move beyond ethics, or to bring politics back in; rather, it is a call to approach the idea of 
just war in light of the realisation that each always, already implies the other. 
 Zehfuss’s argument is both interesting and original, but I take issue with her account of 
just war tradition, and in particular the close relation she posits between just war thinking and 
ethical war. For Zehfuss, the reader will recall, just war thinking provides the framework 
through which the paradox of ethical war is both negotiated and produced. But what is the just 
war tradition? Zehfuss quotes Timothy Challans to the effect that the just war tradition is 
whatever one wants it to be. In his words (Zehfuss 2018, 34): “People can get anything out of 
just war thinking that they put into it. ”There is much truth in this. As Gregory Reichberg (2017, 
202), a leading historian of the just war tradition, has observed, how one defines and delimits 
the idea of just war “will depend, in large measure, on how one draws the contours of the just 
war tradition, namely which authors are included within its fold and which are excluded.”7 The 
issue I take with Zehfuss’s treatment of just war follows from this. 
 At first glance, Zehfuss appears to offer a comprehensive overview of the just war 
tradition, acknowledging the contributions made by a succession of figures, from Saint 
Augustine to Cecile Fabre, to its development over time (30-36). This suggests an awareness 
of the just war tradition as a protean body of thought, which, instead of distilling into a single, 
                                                     
6 It is worth noting that this is very different from how scholars of the just war tradition frame it. For example, 
Walzer (2015, xxvi) described the purpose of his seminal text, Just and Unjust Wars, in terms of “recapturing 
just war for political and moral theory.” Italics added. Jean Bethke Elshtain (1995, 111), who is a foil for many 
of Zehfuss’s arguments, pitched her account of just war theorising in similar terms. I am very grateful to the 
anonymous reviewer for this journal who reminded me of this important point. 
7 Also see: O’Driscoll and Brunstetter (2017, 5). 
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coherent, timeless theory, comprises a weave of historically situated efforts to think through 
the rights of war that, for the most part, are only loosely connected to one another.8 Yet when 
it comes to the crunch, Zehfuss brackets the historicity of the tradition and reduces it to a 
pseudo-Kantian project. A few passages from the text illuminate this. She variously refers to 
just war thinking as a scheme for “determining what, in any given situation, is the right thing 
to do,” and as a provider of “authoritative rules” and “imperatives” that substitute for 
judgement and must be followed (41; 196 – italics added). Elsewhere (44; 51; 29), she describes 
the purpose of just war thinking as the application of a “pre-determined ethics” and set of “ideal 
principles” that are “developed in separation from the realities of war” to this imperfect world.  
These descriptions are not, of course, entirely baseless. They capture the tone and sense 
of purpose of certain contemporary approaches to just war theorising.9 However, by inferring 
that these descriptions apply to the just war tradition in toto, Zehfuss overreaches. Mistaking a 
part for the whole, she extends a critique of the former to the latter. In so doing, she excludes 
the rump of just war thinking that, following the lead of Augustine, takes as its starting point a 
recognition of its own historical limitations and contingency.10 It is this exclusion, and the leap 
from the part to the totality that it enables, that permits Zehfuss to argue (51), in my view 
falsely, that just war tradition misconstrues ethics as “in some way prior to—or at least separate 
from—politics” and “untouched by the grubby realities of the world.” Moreover, I will now 
seek to argue, it is precisely as a result of this false move that Zehfuss mistakes the just war 
tradition as the progenitor of ethical war and not as a bulwark against it.     
 
                                                     
8 The anthology of just war thinking edited by Gregory M. Reichbreg, Henrik Syse, and Endre Begby (2006) 
furnishes proof of this. For more on this idea: Johnson (1999, 39-40); also Johnson (1975) and Clark 2015). 
9 This charge is often levelled at revisionist approaches to just war theory. For an example of this: Brown (2017, 
94-97). For an excellent example of this approach and its contestation, see the exchange between Fernando 
Teson and Terry Nardin in Ethics & International Affairs 19:2 (2005). 
10 On the writings of Augustine: Markus (2010). For more on just war thinking as a reflexive practice: Kelsa 
(2013). 
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The Tragic Vision of Just War 
Even if Zehfuss’s critique of the just war tradition ends up falling wide of the mark, it does us 
a tremendous service by laying bare what I want to call the irony of just war.11 The irony in 
question is best summed up by the familiar truism that “just war is just war”. Critics of just war 
thinking, such as Ken Booth (2000, 316-17), have long alighted on this saying as a way of 
focusing attention on what they see as the real dangers of engaging the just war idiom.12 By 
reminding their readers that just war is just war, they are in fact suggesting that just war 
thinking both distracts from and sanitizes the sheer awfulness of modern war by dressing it up 
in the garb of moral principles. This is, to be sure, a powerful critique.13 It frames just war 
thinking as a vapid but nevertheless pernicious discourse that ennobles military conflict and 
thereby renders it more palatable for general consumption.14 Indeed, by underscoring the grim 
realities of so-called just wars, it punctures the moral pretensions of the just war framework, 
exposing it as so much cant. In the end, it seems, just war is simply just war. 
 Zehfuss’s critique of just war tradition brings this refrain to the fore. It does so by 
repeatedly juxtaposing the realities of so-called just wars with the ideals that purportedly guide 
them. Thus Zehfuss notes (15), on the one hand, the West’s predilection to view its wars as 
actions taken to advance the good and, on the other, the inescapable reality that war necessarily 
involves killing and maiming people. Elsewhere she primes her account of the principle of 
discrimination by setting it against the backdrop of a discussion of war’s inherent violence. 
“War,” she writes (54), “necessarily involves destruction. Buildings are blown up, essential 
                                                     
11 There is much that could be said about what is meant by irony in this context. I use it in a very simple sense to 
denote the process whereby, to paraphrase Reinhold Niebuhr (2008, 158), strength often leads to weakness and 
wisdom issues in foolishness. For a treatment of the role that irony plays in disciplinary thinking about 
international relations: Steele (2010); Brasse (2009); and also Carlson (2008). 
12 Booth goes on to argue that just war discourse is “best seen as a continuation of war by other rhetoric”. Also: 
Fiala (2008). 
13 It is not, however, an especially original critique. It recalls the earlier arguments of Carl Schmitt (2006). For 
an excellent discussion of Schmitt’s critique of just war: Slomp (2006). 
14 There is a parallel here to Wilfred Owen’s response to the idea that it is a noble thing to die for one’s country 
(2015, 2-3).  
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infrastructure is destroyed, lives are ended.”15 Moreover, she affirms that terrible suffering can 
occur in just as well as unjust wars. To this end, she recounts a story involving some U.S. 
soldiers inadvertently killing Iraqi shepherds that highlights how even justly waged wars, that 
is, wars that are waged in accordance with jus in bello norms, produce terrible wrongs and 
hardships (162-65). A simple home-truth emerges from this: No matter how well-intentioned 
they may be, just wars are still nasty, brutish affairs—and unavoidably so. 
 While this home truth will strike many as nothing to get too excited about—it has, as 
we have seen, been discussed by others before—Zehfuss breaks new ground by showing how 
just war scholars have invoked the discourse of “tragedy” to avoid confronting it. On those 
occasions when the gap between the ideal and the realities of just war becomes so vast as to be 
undeniable, the notion of tragedy is called into action as a means of resolving the ensuing 
dissonance (36). Tragedy thus functions as a means of “reconciling” within the just war rubric 
the “remainder” or “excess” that all wars, even just ones, produce (36-37). As such, not only 
does the invocation of tragedy serve to “condone what is apparently condemned”; in so doing 
it also proofs just war thinking against its own pathologies (37). This, Zehfuss argues, should 
fool nobody. It resolves nothing. The evident need to reinforce just war thinking by 
supplementing it with references to tragedy only reaffirms its fundamental inadequacy (38).   
 It is unclear to me whether this is how Zehfuss understands tragedy or merely how she 
perceives it to be deployed in just war scholarship. In either case, it is a shallow, even 
misleading, account of what tragedy entails. A fuller account of tragedy, one that recalls its 
                                                     
15 This line of critique has a storied history. It can be traced back to Erasmus (1997, 97-110) and beyond. The 
Enlightenment philosopher Jean-Jacques Rousseau also made good use of it. As one scholar has observed: “In 
Rousseau’s fiction the pristine order of legal books and political treatises concocted in the calmness of the 
writer’s study meets the brutal realities of war. For Rousseau the state of war as a political concept promotes 
another state of war, one conceived as butchery and suffering (Engberg-Pederson 2015, 2-3).” It is seldom 
acknowledged, however, that so many of the principal figures associated with the just war tradition also 
remarked upon this paradox. They were not unaware of the problematic ways in which their own discourse 
smoothed over the awfulness of war and thus lent it a sheen of respectability. The issue was that, short of 
surrendering the idea that war can be made subject to moral evaluation and restraint, they saw no escape from 
this dynamic. The classic example of this is of course Book III of Augustine’s City of God (1998), but it can 
also be observed in the writings of Francisco de Vitoria (1991, 304) and Hugo Grotius (2005, 78).  
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heritage in the classic works of Aeschylus, Sophocles, and Euripides, would not pretend to 
effect any form of reconciliation, false or otherwise, but would rather emphasise how its 
attraction is matched by its impossibility (e.g., Nussbaum 1986, 45).16 As Peter Euben writes 
(1990, 37), if tragedy “portrays the attractions of simplifying, harmonizing, and freeing oneself 
from the guilt and remorse imposed by practical choices in a complex moral universe”, it also 
illuminates the futile and ultimately self-destructive character of that impulse. The essence of 
tragedy is precisely the fact that it is not something that one can ever hope to resolve, 
circumvent, transcend, or “master” (Erskine and Lebow 2012, 13). Rather, it is something that 
must be endured. As such, it is also an experience through which one can gain both a “necessary 
antidote to the hubris of progressive thought” and a greater appreciation of how the finitude of 
judgement and the need to take responsibility for one’s actions combine to circumscribe the 
human condition (Mayall 2012, 45). This, it seems to me, is a perspicacious way of thinking 
about just war—and of making sense of the uncomfortable reality that just war is just war.17 
Zehfuss does not adopt this approach. Her preference is to turn to the philosophy of 
Jacques Derrida.18 Without wishing to query its merits, I want to note that there are opportunity 
costs associated with this approach. By discounting the proposition that just war should be 
understood in tragic terms, Zehfuss sweeps aside precisely that element of the just war tradition 
that distinguishes it from, and indeed prevents it from being directly generative of, ethical 
                                                     
16 For an excellent general account of Greek tragedy: Hall (2010).  
17 This point may be more contentious than I initially assumed. When I shared an earlier draft of this paper with 
Professor Zehfuss, she joked to the effect that the just war tradition is less interesting than I make it out to be. 
Whatever about how interesting it is, it may well be that my account of just war is out of step with the rest of the 
tradition. As the anonymous reviewers for this journal correctly pointed out to me, neither the revisionist camp 
nor the mainline of the historical approach, as represented by James Turner Johnson, would recognise just war 
as an inherently tragic pursuit. Where the revisionists frame just war within a theory of rights, Johnson situates 
it within a moral theory of good government. I set out an argument in support of my reading elsewhere: 
O’Driscoll (2019).   
18 I will not pretend to have any deep understanding of this approach, but the evidence before me suggests that it 
is a direction well worth pursuing. The sophistication of (relatively) recent works along these or related lines by 
Ronan O’Callaghan (2016) and Peter Lee (2013), as well as by Zehfuss, indicate its rich promise. More 
tangentially: Bulley (2009). 
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war.19 This requires careful explication. To the degree that the idea of ethical war issues from 
just war thinking, it also represents a refusal to countenance the tragic dimension of just war. 
It promises straight lines, clear answers, and easy resolutions, when it is exactly this possibility 
that just war thinking, conceived as a tragic vocation, denies. The upshot of this may be stated 
quite simply. Were Zehfuss to take seriously the idea of just war as a tragic vision, she would, 
I think, find, not that it is a hostage of ethical war, but that it offers both a ready critique of and 
language for resisting it. As such, the relation between the just war tradition and ethical war 
cannot be summed up simply by asserting that the former incubates the latter, and therefore is 
responsible for it, and should be shunned on these grounds. Rather, it must be acknowledged 
that, framed in tragic terms, the just war tradition also provides a necessary critical perspective 
upon, and indeed bulwark against, the idea of ethical war. 
 
The Art of Losing 
The argument to this point can be summed up quite easily. I have suggested that the critique 
Zehfuss offers of just war tradition is wide of the mark, but nevertheless exposes the glaring 
irony at the heart of just war thinking, which is that just war is just war. Following this, I sought 
to make the case that we should treat this irony, not as a reason for abandoning just war 
thinking, but, doubling the irony, as a reason for engaging it even more deeply, which means 
treating it in terms of tragedy.20 I intend now to say something about how we should do that. 
 I take my cue in this from a perhaps unlikely source. The poem, “One Art”, by Elizabeth 
Bishop, provides the beginnings of an answer to the question of how we might embrace the 
irony of just war. The poem is a meditation on loss, and is partly autobiographical in character, 
with the poet’s own experience of bereavement forming its canvas. “One Art” reflects Bishop’s 
                                                     
19 For an excellent if oblique discussion of this general proposition: Rengger (2013). 
20 In doing so, I follow Paul Fussell’s lead (1988, 42) in associating the ironic sensibility with a willingness to 
confront rather than elide the ambiguities we encounter in the political sphere.  
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lifelong struggle to come to terms with the succession of losses she suffered over the course of 
her life, from the death of her father when she was still to an infant, to her mother’s absence 
through mental health issues, and finally to her partner’s suicide. Viewed as a whole, the poem 
exemplifies a fateful approach to loss, which is to say it explores the apparently hard-won belief 
that loss is a part of everyday life and should be accepted as such.  
 
The art of losing isn’t hard to master; 
so many things seem filled with the intent 
to be lost that their loss is no disaster. 
 
The poet even flirts with the idea that loss is something that should be tempted:  
 
Lose something every day. Accept the fluster 
of lost keys, the hours badly spent. 
The art of losing isn’t hard to master. 
 
This level of resolve is hard to sustain, and Bishop’s equanimity in the face of loss shows 
increased signs of wavering as the poem wends towards its poignant conclusion:  
 
--Even losing you (the joking voice, a gesture 
I love) I shan’t have lied. It’s evident 
the art of losing’s not too hard to master 
though it may look like (Write it!) like disaster. 
 
Bishop thus closes the poem on a note that strikes a balance somewhere between resignation 
and defiance. It is only, she concludes, by acknowledging the losses that we suffer, and truly 
recognizing them for the disasters that they are, that we learn to live with them.  
 Moved by Bishop, I wish to propose that the best way of engaging the tragic dimension 
of just war is by thinking about the very notion of just war as a function of loss. This may sound 
fanciful on first airing, but it is actually a very concrete proposal. It would involve embracing 
as the point of departure for just war thinking the idea that all wars, even those that seem 
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justified, are necessarily a (“Write it!”) disaster.21 What this means in practice is being honest 
about the fact that, even if they satisfy every principle and tick-box criterion that theorists can 
conjure, just wars are still a vector of human suffering, and, as such, a wretched thing. Contra 
the idea of ethical war, this approach supposes that just wars should never be viewed as 
something to be celebrated, a good thing, or even as an adequate means of righting a wrong. 
Rather, they should be viewed as miserable affairs that both proceed from and compound the 
prior failure of both politics and hope, such that even when they are right, they are wrong. 
Lowering our expectations of just wars in this way encourages us to approach just war thinking, 
not as a framework that will help us bend war to justice, but as a way of reconciling ourselves 
to the futile necessity of this task.  In fine, just war thinking is about recognizing just wars for 
the disasters that they are, and thereby, so to speak, mastering the art of losing.  
 
Between Tragedy and Irony 
This brings me to the business end of my argument. I have made frequent and, it must be 
admitted, rather laboured references to both tragedy and irony in this article. This has not been 
incidental. If Reinhold Niebuhr cast tragedy and irony as rival ways of situating our political 
selves in history, I want to conclude by arguing that, not only should they be viewed as flip 
sides of the same coin when it comes to just war thinking, it is how they combine that lends 
that enterprise its purchase (Niebuhr 2008, xxiii-xxiv).  
What I have had to say about tragedy is, I hope, clear enough. It is simply that framing 
just war in terms of tragedy allows us a means of, if not disarming the allure of ethical war, at 
least anticipating it. This point is overlooked, not only by Zehfuss in her otherwise thoughtful 
                                                     
21 This approach resonates with the views of Pope John Paul II, who argued that while war could be justified in 
certain circumstances, it is always a disaster (Simpson 2011).  
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analysis of the relation between just war and ethical war, but also, it would seem, by the 
majority of just war scholars.  
My reasons for invoking irony, however, are more obscure. Irony involves the playful 
manipulation of the incongruities that sometimes arise between the literal sense and the deeper 
meaning of a statement. It trades in knowing winks, sardonic reversals, and “absurdities which 
cease to be altogether absurd when fully understood (Ibid., 2).” The claim that “just war is just 
war” is intended to operate on exactly this register. By highlighting in a sly, backhanded 
manner the gap between the ideal and the realities of just war, it pricks the pretension that just 
war is a category apart from other, more obviously brutish forms of war, exposing it as 
delusional.  There is, however, a further level of irony to be mined here. Where the idea that 
“just war is just war” is usually employed to discredit the just war tradition, it can also be taken 
as a reminder of why we need it in the first place. Viewed in this light, what appears as a 
critique of just war thinking can be re-framed as a restatement of its raison d'etre. It is precisely 
because “just war is just war”, with all that this implies, that we must not shy away from it, but 
should instead renew our commitment to thinking carefully and judiciously about it. Put 
differently, instead of treating the realisation that “just war is just war” as grounds for 
abandoning the task of just war thinking, we should take it as a spur to approach just war 
thinking with the intellectual honesty and seriousness it demands. Accordingly, the irony that 
“just war is just war” is not one that just war thinkers should seek to hide from, it is one they 
must confront.22  
 
Conclusion 
This brings us, finally, to the challenge I alluded to in the introduction, namely elucidating why 
all of this amounts to an argument for why we should learn to start worrying by loving the just 
                                                     
22 I discuss some of the ideas treated in this paragraph elsewhere: O’Driscoll (2018; 2019). 
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war tradition. This riff on Doctor Strangelove is, of course, a joke, and a weak one at that. The 
joke, however, is on those who mistakenly think that the purpose of just war tradition is to 
assuage our worries about war, and to show us how we might even learn to like it, or at least 
appreciate it. It is this line of thought that leads us down the dangerous path to ethical war. By 
contrast, the purpose of just war tradition, as I have set it out here, is not to calm us or dispel 
our worries about war, even when we believe war to be justified; but to bring those worries 
front and centre, to ensure we do not forget them, to remind us both of their urgency and 
obduracy; and, in so doing, to keep us from ever falling into the trap of liking war, or even 
cultivating a grudging respect for it. It is, in other words, to grapple with the tragic necessity 
of just war. This is a more vexed, more modest, more minimalist, but also more defensible 
approach to just war thinking than the one that Zehfuss rightly and so ably critiques in War and 
the Politics of Ethics. A source of cold comfort, it does not promise to solve our problems for 
us, only to help us better understand them, so that we can better worry about them. This is no 
small contribution.  
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